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THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND BAILOUT ON
EMERGING GROWTH COUNTRIES
Justice without strength is helpless
strength without justice is tyrannical...
Unable to make what is just strong,
we have made what is strong just.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Amid the advent of a new millennium, the time has come
to reassess the caveat of the code of international economic
conduct promulgated by the creation of the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.2
Prior to World War II, there was no international monetary
system in existence.3 Indeed, the epiphany that an interna-
tional monetary system could make possible a "globally peace-
ful and relatively harmonious evolution of the world economy 4
was an ideology conceived of only amongst those enveloped in
certain intellectual and political colloquial circles. Recognizing
that economic instability contributed to the Great Depression
and World War II, the IMF was intended to act as a guardian
for the international monetary system.5 In that capacity, the
IMF expended credit (with a repayment period of three to five
1. Pascal Pansies, reprinted in THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE IMF, INTRODUCTION (1670), available at http//www.imforg/externall
pubs/ft/pam46/pam46int.htm thereinafter RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IMF] (last visit-
ed Sept. 2, 1999). It is worth noting that the IMF chose this quotation as its
introductory cavalcade. One might ponder whether, in so doing, the quote may be
interpreted as begging a question for which the IMF (among others) has no ready
answer.
2. See ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, at
http://www.imf.org [hereinafter Articles of Agreement] (last visited Sept. 2, 1999).
See also THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965, TWENTY YEARS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION, VOLUME III: DOCUMENTS (J. Keith
Horsefield ed. 1960) [hereinafter THE IMF].
3. See THE IMF, supra note 2, at 3.
4. See RESPONSBILITIES OF THE IMF, supra note 1.
5. Jacques J. Polak, The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund:
A Changing Relationship, in BROOKINGS OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1 (The Brookings
Institution eds. 1994) [hereinafter WORLD BANK].
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years) to countries experiencing payment difficulties caused
either by their own making or by a recession in the world econ-
omy in an attempt to ensure world-wide peace by averting
global instability.6 However, critics charge that recent IMF
measures, including the IMF's support of the Suharto govern-
ment, heightened the Asian crisis by allowing sweetheart busi-
ness arrangements to exist in Indonesia.7 Moreover, critics
claim that IMF funds earmarked for Russia were siphoned to
the Bank of New York in an elaborate money laundering
scheme.8 The critics contend that other IMF practices serve as
an exercise in obsolescence culminated primarily by the IMF
bailouts9 to emerging growth countries."0 Further, critics
claim that the IMF, in lieu of being a catalyst for economic
improvement, denies emerging growth countries the opportu-
nity to become self-sufficient, or otherwise correct their eco-
nomic maladjustments." This Note contends that the critics
are wrong: Today's global economy dictates the very measures
instituted, implemented, and utilized by the IMF. Moreover,
this Note disputes cries calling for the bifurcation or demise of
the IMF because such measures negate the goals of the IMF
and are counter-productive to ensuring stabilization and sol-
vency in emerging growth countries. This Note argues that the
IMF's pliability in dealing with emerging-growth countries
satisfies the economic needs of such countries. Indeed, the IMF
remains a vital requirement to continued global market expan-
sion as "major countries are affected by each others' economic
conditions more so now than in the past."" This Note main-
6. See id. at 2.
7. The IMF Replies, Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1998 at
httpI/www.imf.orglexternanp/vc1998/123098/HTM. (last visited Nov. 4, 1999). See
also Indonesian Experience, IMF Surv., May 22, 2000; Indonesia: The Jitters Re-
turn, THE ECONOMIST, May 20, 2000, at 52.
8. The Next Russian Bail Out, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1998, at 60.
9. In the context of this Note, bailouts include Stand-By arrangements, ex-
tended arrangements, contingency and contemporary arrangements, including, but
not limited to, special drawing rights ("SDRs") and other types of IMF financial
assistance expended by the IMF to member countries for which the IMF has been
unable to collect.
10. Doug Bandow, Endless Aid, Endless Bailouts, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1998,
at C-1.
11. Id. But see, Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF, Ad-
dress (Jan. 28, 1998) at httpJ/www.hnf.orglexternalnp/speechesl1998/012298.htm.
12. See Bandow, supra note 10.
13. THE BRETrON WOODS COMMISSION, BRLTTON WOODS: LOOKING TO THE
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tains that the IMF, in addition to helping balance an integrat-
ed world economy, strengthens the international community by
its succinct understanding of the different perceptual, social,
and cultural norms unique to each country. In so doing, the
IMF satisfies the Kantian philosophy of doing that which is
"just" for its own sake.'4 Although "the poor [are] most vul-
nerable to recessions... [and] are most severely affected when
governments reduce expenditures to meet budget constraints
by cutting... Uobs] and social services,""5 the IMF's invalu-
able assistance may well be viewed in psychological terms
acting as a reinforcer of self worth to individuals. 6
Part Two of this Note will present an overview of the IMF,
as well as explore the historical memories of the political, eco-
nomic, and social turbulence that served as the impetus for the
Bretton Woods Conference,'7 culminating in a consensus de-
signed to deal with helping countries set their economies on
paths of sustained and sound development and growth. 8 Part
Three asserts that the IMF is, and will continue to be, a stable
foundation of sustainable economic growth in the international
community, and will discuss the effects of the bailouts by the
IMF in each of Brazil, Indonesia, and the Russian Federation.
Part Four of this Note will summarize and concentrate on the
viability of the IMF's existence if the dichotomy between the
critics of the IMF vfs-a-vfs the consequences achieved to date
are not soon rectified.
FUTURE, COMMISSION REPORT, STAFF REVIEW, BACKGROUND PAPERS 4 (1994) [here-
inafter BWC]. Today, it is not unusual for the financial and monetary conditions
of one nation to have an immediate repercussion on other nations. This causes an
increase in financial market volume and volatility.
14. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, 1781. See also SHARON
S. BREHm: & SAUL M. KASSIN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Houghton Mifflin Co. ed. 1996)
[hereinafter SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY].
15. See BWC, supra note 13, at A-3.
16. See SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 14, at 515.
17. See RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IMF, supra note 1. See also DAVID BRODY,
WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, ESSAYS ON THE TWENTIETH CENTURY STRUGGLE
50 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1993). Across America, "[elven the most skepti-
cal devotees of the old dog-eat-dog theory of business competition . .. are being
gradually persuaded from the sheer, cold pressure of the facts that ... war does-
n't pay in this complicated world of ours.' Id. This author posits that a necessary
precursor to peace is economic stability achieved by the eradication of poverty
through gainful employment.
18. See RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IMF, supra note 1.
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II. BACKGROUND/HISTORY OF THE IMF
A Creation
Prior to World War II, there was no international mone-
tary system in existence. 9 Indeed, the epiphany that an inter-
national monetary system could make possible a "globally
peaceful and relatively harmonious evolution of the world
economy"" were idealogies conceived of only amongst those
enveloped in certain intellectual and political colloquial circles;
including noted British economist, John Keynes.2 In the early
1930s, Keynes unveiled a plan for an International Currency
Union designed to ameliorate then current conditions in the
international arena (the "Keynes Plan").22 The Keynes Plan
was "based on international bank-money.'.. fixed (but not
unalterably) in terms of gold and accepted as the equivalent of
gold by the British... and the United States and all members
of the Union for the purpose of settling international balanc-
es."' Albeit not embraced at that time, several of the ideas
promulgated in the Keynes Plan were later modified in part
and incorporated in the Joint Statement by Experts on the
Establishment of an International Monetary Fund24 (the
"Joint Statement"). Released soon after meetings were held be-
tween Keynes and Washington officials in September-October,
1943,' the Joint Statement was proffered as an anodyne to
nations battling "decades of beggar-thy-neighbor foreign ex-
change and trade restrictions and competitive devaluations
culminating in global depression and armed conflict."26 Among
the modifications to the Keynes Plan were alternative techni-
cal setups, resulting in differences in the way balances or run
overdrafts were posted, allusions to the introduction of a new
international unit, as well as a more elastic provision for ex-
19. See THE IMF, supra note 2, at 4.
20. See RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IMF, supra note 1.
21. See THE IMF, supra note 2, at 128.
22. See id. at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 128.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4.
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change rates and for subsequent modifications in the rates
initially established.27
B. Purpose
On July 22, 1944, the United Nations Monetary and Fi-
nancial Conference released the "Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund" ("Articles of Agreement").' The
Articles of Agreement stated that the purposes of the IMF
would be:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a
permanent institution which provides the machinery for
consultation and collaboration on international monetary
problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of inter-
national trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion
and maintenance of high levels of employment and real in-
come and to the development of the productive resources of
all members as primary objectives of economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly ex-
change arrangements among members, and to avoid competi-
tive exchange depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of
payments in respect of current transactions and in the elimi-
nation of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the
growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the Fund's
resources available to them under adequate safeguards, thus
providing them with the opportunity to correct maladjust-
ments in their balance of payments without resorting to mea-
sures destructive of national or international prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration
and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international
balances of payments of members.
The Fund shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes
set forth in this Article.29
The IMF, designed to serve as the center of the postwar
international monetary system, was envisioned as a system
27. See THE IMF, supra note 2, at 129.
28. See ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 2.
29. Id.
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based on fixed exchange rates, with rates allowed to be
changed only in instances where the rates had become unsus-
tainable. ° In addition, membership in the IMF entailed cer-
tain rights (including access to credit) and obligations (obser-
vance of the agreed rules on exchange rates and currency re-
strictions).3 Further, a condition precedent to membership in
the World Bank was posited on demonstration that a country
was a member of the IMF. 2 In other words, the IMF acted as
the guardian for the international monetary system and served
to help countries experiencing payment difficulties stick to the
rules of the IMF system "whether the difficulties were of their
own making... policy slippages... or, by a recession in the
world economy."33 Member countries were expected to repay
any credit expended by the IMF within a three- to five-year
period.' The IMF served as a beacon for short-term economic
relief 5 and provided financial resources to help member coun-
tries during periods of adjustment when extreme balance of
payments difficulties arose in an attempt to "maintain the
Bretton Woods par value system of fixed, but adjustable, ex-
change rates."3" In addition, the IMF served as a solace to
allay the enormous suffering caused by the social turbulence of
the 1930s through efforts designed to prevent the recurrence of
such episodes."7 From its inception until roughly the early
1960s, the IMF's par value system allowed it to be "accepted as
the referee of the system... [and] the U.S. dollar, whose
convertibility into gold was guaranteed by the United States,
[thereafter] became the main reserve currency in the world."38
C. History
The veracity of the IMF's historical role is most notably
evidenced by the emergence of the Vietnam War and Johnson's
30. See WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 2.
31. See ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 2.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See BWC, supra note 13, at A-3.
37. See RESPONSIBIU1IES OF THE IMF, supra note 1. Note that reflection must
be given to both the economic and social/psychological impact of such economic
measures.
38. See BWC, supra note 1.3, at B-10.
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Great Society programs." "History conveys that it is only
after severe crisis and widespread conflicts that fertile grounds
are found for the gathering on international consensus on
norms of behavior to their re-emergence."40 Inflationary fi-
nancing began straining the U.S. dollar during the 1960s, and,
as inflation grew, the value of the U.S. dollar dropped.4' At
the same time, other countries were able to "adjust the value
of... [their] currency against the U.S. dollar when the need
arose... [but] there was no... way for the [U.S.] dollar to
adjust its value vis-a-vis gold and the other major currencies of
the world."2 However, the IMF, in compliance with the terms
of its Articles of Agreement to promote, facilitate and give
confidence to its members,43 adjusted to the turbulent tide."
In 1969, the Articles of Agreement were amended and the
IMF was allowed to add its own money, called special drawing
rights (SDRs), to the existing stock of gold and dollars.45
SDRs thus alleviated U.S. difficulties arising from the fact that
there was no politically correct way for the U.S. dollar to ad-
just its value vis-a-vfs gold and the other major currencies of
the world.46 During the same period, "Western Europe and
Japan became strong competitors in global markets... [and
the] United States slipped from being the world's largest credi-
tor nation to being its largest debtor."47 Indeed, due to inter-
national trade imbalance, instability of the dollar and large
U.S. fiscal deficit, continued global stability and growth were
threatened.48 This scenario conflicted greatly with the U.S.
commentary of Questions and Answers issued by the U.S.
Treasury which explained the view of the U.S. on the Articles
39. Id.
40. See RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IMF, supra note 1.
41. See BWC, supra note 13, at 8.
42. Id.
43. See THE IMF, supra note 2, at 187.
44. See BWC, supra note 13, at B-10.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 8. "A member's quota in the IMF determines, in particular, the
amount of its subscription, its voting weight, its access to IMF financing, and its
allocation of SDRs." Russian Federation Accepts Article VIII Obligations, Press
Release No. 96/29, available at http//www.imf.orglexternal/np/secdpr/
1996/PR9629.HTM (last visited Nov. 5, 1999).
47. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: PULLING
TOGETHER 5 (Richard E. Feinberg et al. eds., 1989).
48. Id.
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of Agreement.49 In particular, the U.S. view was that the IMF
was "not designed to provide resources for relief, nor.., to
provide capital for reconstruction."" Instead, the U.S. com-
mentary stressed that the primary objective of economic policy
must be the maintenance of a high level of employment and
real income,5 reiterating the aims set forth in the Joint
Statement on the International Monetary Fund. By 1971, the
"window for dollar convertibility into gold was closed."52
Although the IMF's primary objective was to provide eco-
nomic relief, reality suggests that the effects were two-fold.
Higher employment and income levels may have a significant
bearing on an individual's psychological well-being."3 Since a
precursor to employment is often a "compatibility" factor, com-
panies tend to employ those whom they view as compatible."
Individuals who feel that they are "liked" tend to have higher
self-esteem, and are often viewed as "compatible" to a
companies' needs.55 Coupled with higher employment and in-
come, an individual tends to have a higher self-esteem, thus
fostering less chance of serious social turbulence in society."
Given these circumstances, it is no surprise that by adapting
to changes in the system of payments arrangements, as well as
rules and policy adjustments, the IMF has continued to rein-
vent itself and remain successful by focusing on macroeconomic
stabilization and structural adjustment reforms to ameliorate
social concerns such as "rising unemployment, malnutrition
and social marginalization.5 7 In turn, with balanced and flex-
ible fiscal policies, countries were able to stabilize exchange
49. See U.S. Commentary, Questions and Answers on the International Mone-
tary Fund, reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND VOL. III: DOCUMENTS
136 (J. Keith Horshfield ed., 1969).
50. Id. at 139.
51. See JOINT STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, available
at httpJ/Avww.imf.org (last visited Sept. 2, 1999).
52. See BWC, supra note 13, at B-10.
53. See SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 14.
54. Id. Intuitively, as well as on a practical level, it makes no sense for a
company to hire employees who are difficult and unlikeable if the company wishes
to increase productivity.
55. Id.
56. Id. See also Indonesia: The Jitters Return, THE ECONOMIST, May 20, 2000,
at 52; A Cautious Comeback for Brazil's Cardoso, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2000,
at 33.
57. See Social Dimensions of the IMF's Policy Dialogue, (Mar. 1999), at
http'J/www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/social.htm [hereinafter Policy Dialogue].
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rates and pursue domestic growth and price stability."
Hence, approximately twenty-five years after the IMF's goal to
regulate "rules of conduct governing exchange rates and inter-
national payments,"59 by the 1970s such ideas, originally
couched in idealistic terms, were notably visible by the fact
that major industrial countries abandoned the par value sys-
tem. However, the IMF faced a serious crisis of purpose as its
original core mission of stabilizing the international monetary
system virtually disappeared. 0
Technological advancements in communications and com-
puters of the 1980s, as well as deregulation and various finan-
cial innovations, resulted in an increase in the globalization of
capital markets culminating with the debt crisis of the
1980s.6 The IMF recognized the need for adjustments in
banking standards soon after some of the poorest and most
heavily indebted developing countries fell in arrears on pay-
ments. By 1988, the Basle Capital Accord, responsible for es-
tablishing international capital standards for banks, was creat-
ed.62 In the 1990s, the IMF played a major role in formulating
a smooth transformation of former communist countries to
capital markets.' In each specified instance, the IMF re-
sponse of devoting greater attention to these issues complied
with the terms of its Articles of Agreement.'
This Note posits that the IMF's bailouts remain economi-
cally feasible, socially commendable and environmentally
sound solutions, notably by the fact that the IMF has devoted
additional resources to bear in its program design. 5 Both a
historical and present-day examination of the IMF's role sup-
port the assertion that the institution's adaption to ever-chang-
ing circumstances remains a pragmatic and valuable approach
to continued success in the international arena. In dealing
with developing and transforming economies, policies imple-
mented by the IMF are, by and large, appropriate as discussed
in greater depth in Part III of this Note. As explained below, in
58. See BWC, supra note 13, at A-3.
59. Id.
60. See WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at A-6.
61. Id. at B-4.
62. See WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
63. See BWO, supra note 13, at A-3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at B-10.
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its dealings with emerging growth countries, the IMF will
continue to enhance its value to all of its members, and to the
world economy as a whole.66
III. EXAMPLES OF THE EFFECT OF THE IMF BAILOUT IN
EMERGING GROWTH COUNTRIES
An examination of declining economies rescue packages
implemented in the form of bailouts by the IMF in the Brazil-
ian, Indonesian,and Russian markets will be examined in this
Note.67 Specifically, such examination reveals that recessions
have been averted, a marked effect on rising interest rates has
been noted,and an anodyne for the currency crisis in such
markets has been, or soon will be, achieved.
A. Brazil
In January of 1946, Brazil pledged membership to the
IMF.68 Until the mid-1960s, the IMF provided credit to Brazil
on the condition that necessary adjustments in the macroeco-
nomics policies be made to restore balance of payments equilib-
rium quickly; and Brazil complied with such conditions."
During the 1970s and 1980s, Brazil fought an unending battle
with the instability of its real currency, high inflation, and
66. Id. at A-3.
67. What Did It Get Us?, Editorial WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1999, at C-1. "Res-
cue package" is synonymous to "bailouts" by the IMF in emerging growth coun-
tries.
68. According to the Treasurer's Department, Accounts and Financial Reports
Division of the IMF, as of November 30, 2000, Brazil's General Resources Account
is as follows:
SDR Million % Quota
General Resources Account
Quota 3,036.10 100.00
Fund holdings of currency 4,393.57 144.7
SDR Department
Net cumulative allocation 358.67 100.0
Holdings 1.64 0.5
Outstanding Purchases and Loans
Stand-by arrangements 1,356.75 44.7
available at http://www.imf.orgfnp/tre/tad/exfimd2.cmf./memberKey=90 (last visited
Dec. 27, 2000).
69. Brazil: Work Cut Out, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 1999, at 37 [hereinafter
BRAZIL].
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unemployment rate.?" Today, due to the measures instituted
by the IMF, the real is again stable, public finances are im-
proving, and interest rates are down.
7
'
In December 1998, the IMF Stand-By Arrangement pro-
vided Brazil with a loan of SDR 13 billion (U.S. $18.1 bil-
lion)72 and proposed a structural reform agenda, including
changes to Brazil's then current social security program, bud-
getary procedures, and its tax policy.73 A substantial privat-
ization program also was implemented.74 On January 15,
1999, the Brazilian government decided to float the real.75
The move to such a flexible exchange rate led to "a sustained
acceleration of inflation and inflationary expectations."76 In-
deed, during the following five weeks while Brazil and the IMF
hammered out an accord for a new agreement, which would
allow Brazil to obtain approximately $9 billion in IMF assis-
tance, Brazil's real recovered to its highest level against the
dollar in five weeks.77 Recent IMF estimates revealed that
Brazilian GDP averaged approximately four percent at the end
of 2000, while the tight holding of fiscal and monetary policies
held inflation down." In addition, recession is expected to de-
fer to a sustainable recovery and year 2000 estimates by the
IMF for the Brazilian economy forecast growth of up to four
percent with inflation falling to approximately 6.5 percent.79
However, these forecasts are contingent upon Brazil's ability to
maintain policy discipline in such a way that investors will
have a renewed confidence to again revisit the option of invest-
ing in Brazil. Current IMF projections show a possibility of
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. IMF Approves SDR 13 Billion Stand-By Credit for Brazil; Activates NAB
(Dec. 2, 1998), at http//www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/PR9859.htm.
73. IMF Approves Credit Disbursement to Brazil, (Mar. 30, 1999), at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/nb/1999/NB9914.htm.
74. Id. Privatization programs approved by the IMF included reforming civil
service, tax policy, budgetary procedures, and social security. Id.
75. Brazil Memorandum of Economic Policies, at http'J/www.inf.orglexternal/np/
loi/1999/080299.HTM [hereinafter BRAZIL MEMORANDUM OF ECONOMIC POLICIES]
(last visited Nov. 4, 1999). The real is the Brazilian unit of currency.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. IMF Completes Brazil Sixth Review, at http-/www.imf.org/externa]/np/secd
nb/2000/nb00108.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2001).
79. Id.
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currency stabilization at 1.7 reals to the dollar by the end of
year 2000.80 In the interim, nominal interest rates are expect-
ed to fall from their current 45 percent to 28.8 percent.8' But,
without the IMF's continued pragmatic support and guidance,
such stability remains doubtful.
In March 1999, Brazil proposed, through a Memorandum
of Economic Policies, a formal inflation targeting framework
for monetary policy scheduled to commence in July 1999.82 At
the end of June 1999, inflation in consumer prices was project-
ed (measured by an increase in the national IPCA price index)
as follows: "8 percent in 1999, 6 percent in 2000 and 4 percent
in 2001."' The BCB (Central Bank of Brazil) is responsible
for conducting monetary policies in such a way as to meet
responsibly these goals by, among other measures, preparing
quarterly inflation reports that will base forecasts on a wide
range of indicators, including an ongoing survey of market
expectations.' The policy framework implemented, together
with higher interest rates, accounted for a rapid decline in the
monthly rate of inflation and permitted "an early correction of
the exchange rate overshoot."' Moreover, the current down-
ward spiral of interest rates remains only slightly above projec-
tions and may be regarded as "an appropriate real interest
rate in the present macroeconomic conditions;""6 a sign that
the financial initiatives implemented by the HVIF are on track.
Indeed, since the devaluation of the real, the Brazilian econo-
my has had two successive quarters of growth with 1999 year
end inflation closely matching the official target range of six-
to-ten percent.8 7 Further, 2000 year end estimates predicting
80. Id. See also Arminio Fraga, Monetary Policy During the Transition to a
Floating Exchange Rate: Brazil's Recent Experience, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT,
Mar. 2000, No. 1, at http//www.imf.orgexternal/pubs/fandd/2000/03/fraga.htm.
81. Id. To facilitate the fall in interest rates, the Brazilian Government has
emphasized a willingness dedicated to the current rate regime, as well the contin-
uation of ongoing structural reform efforts in the social security system, tax sys-
tem, budgetary system, and labor markets among others. See Joint Statement of
Understanding by the Brazilian Authorities and the IMF Management, at
httpJ/www.imf.orgexternal/np/sec/nb/1998/NB9836A.HTM (last visited Sept. 2,
1999). Moreover, the IMF fully supports such policies. Id.
82. See BRAZIL MEiORANDUM OF ECONOMIC POLICIES, supra note 75.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Brazil's Unsteady Recovery, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 1999, at 89.
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that inflation would meet a target of four-to-eight percent
inflation achieved their stated goal.8
To assure the overall program implemented by the IMF, in
April of 1999, Brazil submitted to its Congress the Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Law, which is expected to be ratified shortly.89
Proposals in the bill include the prohibition of financing cur-
rent spending of one level of government by another.9 ° The
bill also prohibits the use of borrowed resources to finance
current spending (the so-called "Golden Rule"),9 and requires
that limits be set on indebtedness, notably with federal, state,
and municipal government personnel.92
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the danger of spiral-
ing inflation prompting a possible return to automatically
adjusting prices and wages against past inflation cannot be
denied a priori." Indeed, while Brazil remains somewhat vul-
nerable to shocks in international financial markets, the
strengthening of domestic economic policies, and the shift to a
floating exchange rate regime, have reduced significantly the
vulnerability involved, and, absent a major shock, such vulner-
ability is improbable at present.' So long as the IMF is al-
lowed to continue on its present course, "net capital inflows to
Brazil [which] are projected to exceed current account financ-
ing needs by a modest margin in the second half of 1999, lead-
ing to an operable balance of payments surplus of around U.S.
$3 billion during that period"95 are attainable objectives. In
particular, growing foreign direct investment (FDI) should
88. The Americas: Progress and Pitfalls in Brazil's Public Finances, THE ECON-
OMIST, May 6, 2000, at 37. See also IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation With
Board, at http/www.imf.orgextemal/np/sectpn/2000/pn0094.htm (last visited Jan.
24, 2001).
89. See BRAZIL MEMORANDUM OF ECONOMIC POLICIES, supra note 75.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Decreasing inflation, limits on current indebtedness monitored by the Bank
of Brazil, devaluation and floatation of the real coupled with the Brazilian Fiscal
Responsibility Law are 'material factors that decrease Brazil's susceptibility to
losing its current balance. However, foreign capital inflows into Brazil may dissi-
pate due to other factors. In order to present a circumspect picture of the current
situation, such a possibility, although unlikely, must be recognized and noted.
94. The probability that Brazil will not succumb to a return of spiraling infla-
tion is conditioned on the supposition that foreign capital inflows will not dissi-
pate.
95. See BRAZIL MEMORANDUM OF ECONOMIC POLICIES, supra note 75.
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keep up the "strong pace" attributable to sound IMF finan-
cial policies and assistance. 7
During the first two quarters of 1999, the Brazilian econo-
my performed "significantly better than projected in the re-
vised [IMF] Fund-supported program of the Brazilian govern-
ment."98 In 2000, inflation performance remained above aver-
age, with the GDP averaging at approximately four percent.99
These developments contributed to a decline in Brazil's nomi-
nal interest rates from 26.3 percent in 1999 to projections at
17.6 percent in 2000.0 However, the recovery of internation-
al oil prices threatened the Brazilian economy with a substan-
tial revenue shortfall.10' To compensate, in 1999, Brazil in-
creased prices on average by 18 percent, and conforming
changes will continue to reflect the fluctuating exchange rate
and international oil prices.0 2 While external trade develop-
ments have operated less favorably than projected, with the
trade balance continuing to reflect a small deficit in the first
five months of 1999 due to export volumes, a less steep decline
in import values has been since noted.0 3 Such programs will
continue to receive priority in the allocation of budgetary re-
sources during the plan period.0 4 Brazil intends to engage in
partnerships with multilateral development banks and private
sector investors through leveraged finance programs.0 5
On November 27, 2000, the IMF Executive Board ("Board")
96. Id.
97. IMF Completes Brazil Fifth Review, at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/xecdnb/2000/NB00.33.htm. See also Brazilian Memo-
randum of Economic Policies: A Memorandum of Understanding, Apr. 20, 2000, at
http//www.imp.org/externaNP/LI/2000/bra01/INDEXHT.
98. IMF Completes Brazil Review and Approves Next Credit Tranche, News
Brief No. 99/45, at http://www.imf.org/extera/np/serdnb/1999/NB9945.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 1999) [hereinafter IMF BRAZIL REVIEW].
99. IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Brazil, PIN No. 00/94, Dec.
22, 2000, at http'//www.imf.org/externalnp/secdpn/2000/pn0094.htm [hereinafter IMF
CONSULTATION].
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See IMF BRAZIL REVIEW, supra note 98. Indeed, the IMF's Executive
Board opines that the floating exchange rate regime has served Brazil well thus
far, and, with the continuation of appropriate macroeconomic policies and structur-
al reform, Brazil will "contribute to a significant and sustained improvement in
the current account of the balance of payments in the period ahead." Id&
105. See BRAZIL MEMORANDUM OF ECONOMIC POLICIES, supra note 75.
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concluded its Article IV consultation and a sixth review of
Brazil's Stand-By Arrangement.' The Board was satisfied
with the recent developments, particularly in the areas of
stabilizing economic recovery and low inflation.0 7 In addi-
tion, the pass-through of depreciation to prices has been rela-
tively modest so far, and consumer price inflation has re-
mained in line with the government's target and has remained
subdued.' 8 For the 1999 fiscal year, real GDP declined by
one percent or less, with consumer price inflation containment
at approximately eight percent.' 9 Recently, the IMF Board
commended the Brazilian authorities for their commitment to
the policies supported by the arrangement with the IMF, ex-
emplified by the achievement of a primary fiscal surplus by the
consolidated public sector "equivalent to at least 3.1 percent of
GDP in 1999," " °o and for meeting inflationary targets in ac-
cord with a firm monetary policy."' With the assistance of
the IMF, "Brazil has achieved a commendable economic re-
cord."" Inflation has been reduced from over 2000 percent in
1994, to less than five percent in 1998, and Brazil has under-
taken structural reforms, especially in trade liberalization and
privatization of state enterprises."'
One barrier remains to optimal success in Brazil: unem-
ployment. Although a present-day rise in unemployment has
been noted since 1997," the official projected unemployment
106. See IMF CONSULTATION, supra note 99.
107. See IMF Completes Brazil Sixth Review, at http'//www.imf.org/external/np/
sec/nb/2000/nbOO108.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2000).
108. Id.
109. IMF Completes Brazil Review and Approves Next Credit Tranche, News
Brief No. 99/45, at http'J/www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/080299.HTM (last visited
Nov. 5, 1999).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Michael Mussa, The IMF: Doctor, Savior - or Wastrel: A Letter to the
Editor, BUS. W., Dec. 28, 1998, available at http'J/www.inf.org/externalnp/vc/1998/
122898A.HTM. Mr. Mussa is Director of the IMF's Research Department.
113. Id.
114. See BRAZIL, supra note 69, at 37. However, it should be noted that
DIEESE, a Brazilian union-backed research group has an unofficial estimate: Al-
most 20 percent of the workforce in San Paulo (approximately 1.7 million people)
are not fully employed. San Paulo, in particular, has been especially hard hit,
with 560,000 industrial jobs lost since 1994. To illustrate the conditions, 50,000
applicants showed up to apply for jobs sweeping the streets of San Paulo which
pays only 136 reals (U.S. $81) per month. Id.
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rate for 2000 was 7.4 percent.1 This rise in unemployment
is due primarily to advancements in technology. Acknowledg-
ing that while "many economic changes that are in themselves
good for Brazil are likely to mean more job cuts,""6 Pedro
Malan, Finance Minister of Brazil, recently enunciated, "only
continuing stability can produce the kind of sustained, long-
term economic development needed to create enough jobs and
get the unemployed back to work on a permanent basis.""7
Not only is the social crisis and instability caused by rising
unemployment well understood by the IMF, this Note contends
that the funding provided by the IMF is a necessary ingredient
for Brazil's government to continue to provide job creation
programs. Without such programs, there may be nothing to
"ensure that the [current] jobless are still alive to enjoy the
fruits of stability when they eventually mature.""
B. Indonesia
In February of 1967, Indonesia became a member of the
IMF," 9 and during the ensuing 25 years Indonesia enjoyed a
115. See supra note 88.
116. See BRAZIL MEMORANDUM OF ECONOMIC POLICIES, supra note 75. The
negative effect of job cuts is social instability. It is interesting to note that
Sigmund Freud viewed aggression toward others to be "a momentary victory for
the life instinct, not death instinct. In aggression, the force of the death instinct is
deflected outward at others rather than aimed inward toward the original target
of the self." See SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 14, at 290. Thus, it may be ar-
gued that social turbulence is equivocal to a survival instinct. Moreover, without
economic growth it is difficult for countries to promote change elsewhere in the
world. For example, when "unemployment is stubbornly high, electorates are less
charitable about helping the rest of the world, even if it is in their . . . self-inter-
est to do so." See BWC, supra note 13, at B-4.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. According to the Treasurer's Department, Accounts and Financial Reports
Division of the IMF, as of November 30, 2000, Indonesia's General Resources Ac-
count is as follows:
SDR Million % Quota
General Resources Account
Quota 2,079.30 100.00
Fund holdings of currency 10,251.80 493.0
Reserve position in Fund 145.47 7.0
SDR Department
Net cumulative allocation 238.96 100.0
Holdings 24.50 10.3
Outstanding Purchases and Loans
Stand-by arrangements 3,669.12 176.5
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period of sustained economic progress, a tripling of its income
per capita, and a sharp decline in the number of people living
in poverty. 2 ' However, in 1997, Thailand's baht"2' was
floated, causing severe pressure on the rupiah, the Indonesian
currency.'22 By August of 1997, Indonesia announced that it
would "abolish its exchange rate intervention band and allow
the rupiah to float,""= partly in response to turbulence in re-
gional currency markets.2 Anxious to address its financial
difficulties, on October 31, 1997, the government of Indonesia
submitted a Letter of Intent to the IMF outlining programs
that they intended to implement in order to overcome their
current financial difficulties." To do so, Indonesia requested
a three-year Stand-By Arrangement from the IMF "in an
amount equivalent to SDR 7.3 billion or 590 percent of quo-
ta."'26 Plagued by insolvent and debt-ridden banks, it was
Indonesia's desire to overcome certain "structural rigidities in
the economy."27
On November 5, 1997, the IMF approved a stand-by credit
for Indonesia, authorizing drawings of up to SDR 7.338 billion
(about U.S. $10.14 billion) to support Indonesia's macroeco-
nomic stabilization and structural reform program. 2 ' In
granting the request, the IMF employed accelerated procedures
established under the Emergency Financing Mechanism
(EFM), adopted in 1995.129 The EFM allows the IMF the abil-
ity to respond swiftly to support a member country which faces
Extended arrangements 4,648.85 223.6
available at http:www.imf.orglnp/treltad/exfund2.cfm (last visited Dec. 27, 2000)
120. See IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Indonesia, PIN No. 99/33
at http//www.imf.org./external/np/sec/pn/1999/PN9933.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999)
[hereinafter IMF Indonesian Consultation].
121. The baht is Thailand's unit of currency.
122. See Indonesia Letter of Intent, (Oct. 31, 1997), at http:J/www.hnf.orgJ exter-
na/np/Iloi/103197.HTM (last visited Nov. 4, 1999) [hereinafter INDONESIA LETTER OF
INTENT].
123. See IMF Welcomes Indonesia's Exchange Rate Action, News Brief No.
9718, at http'/www.irnf.orgJexternalnp/secnb/1997/NB9718.htm (last visited Nov.
4, 1999).
124. Id.
125. See INDONESIA LETTER OF INTENT, supra note 122.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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an external financial crisis by providing financial assistance to
support a strong economic adjustment program.13
By January of 1998, however, the rupiah had depreciated
significantly and IMF representatives went to Indonesia to
access economic and market developments by negotiating ac-
celeration of needed reforms already agreed to under the IMF-
supported program.' U.S. Secretary of Defense, William S.
Cohen, also attended the meeting, and on January 14, 1998, he
reaffirmed the U.S. position that "Indonesia's participation in
the United Nations' peace-keeping missions has made it a force
for peace in the world. In addition, Indonesia plays a key role
in maintaining regional stability."'32 Whether less reliance on
Indonesia's peace-keeping ability, with an increased focus on
Indonesia's financial situation, may have averted the spark
which ignited the present day crisis in East Timor remains a
vexing question.
On January 16, 1998, IMF Managing Director Michel
Camdessus announced that Indonesia and the IMF had
reached agreement on a strengthened and reinforced economic
program." New budgetary actions designed to avoid undue
fiscal deterioration and contraction that would further depress
economic activity were implemented, including canceling
twelve scheduled Indonesian infrastructure projects and limit-
ing public spending to vital items." Moreover, the fears
raised that Indonesia's raising of fuel prices3 5 might lead to
riots and detrimentally affect the poor were offset by the reali-
ty that gasoline was used by mostly high income people, and
that kerosene (the cooking fuel of the poor) only had a 25 per-
cent price increase.'36
On May 4, 1998, the IMF Board released its first review of
Indonesia's Economic Program. The Board supported a pro-
130. Id.
131. See Indonesia and IMF Reach Agreement on Economic Reforms: Debate in
U.S. Shifts to IMF Funding, at httpA/www.foreignaffairs.orgenvoy/documents/
v9n2_economic_crisis.html (last visited Sept. 2, 1999).
132. Id.
133. See Statement by the Managing Director on the IMF Program with Indo-
nesia, News Brief No. 98/2, at http//www.imf.orgexternal/np/sec/1998/NB9802.htm
(last visited Nov. 4, 1999).
134. Id.
135. Fortunately, mounted concerns that riots would erupt after an almost
overnight 70 percent increase on the price of gasoline were for naught. Id.
136. Id.
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gram designed to implement rigorously the strengthening of
monetary policies, and "also emphasized the importance they
attached to those provisions of the program, including subsi-
dies, which are designed to soften the impact of the economic
crisis on the poorer people in Indonesia."" Following such
approval, the IMF approved the release of disbursement of
SDR 733.8 million (about U.S. $989.4 million)."8 However, by
September of 1998, the inflation rate was 82 percent, the rupi-
ah depreciated approximately 75 percent, and one-month inter-
est rates were approaching 64 percent. 39 Ignoring satirical
utterances by economists that Indonesia suffered from the
"worst case of Asian flu," 140 the IMF remained dedicated to
the Indonesian community by its continued assistance.
The guidance and assistance provided by the IMF proved a
success. By August of 1999, inflation fell below six percent, the
rupiah gained strength, and one-month interest rates dropped
to below 13 percent.' These results provide the valuable les-
son that political stability and reform momentum often go
hand in hand. The IMF and Indonesia worked together in an
attempt to eliminate the sweetheart business arrangements
that distorted Indonesia's real economy while keeping a safety
net on targeted social subsidies in order to reach millions of
needy families.
Cognizant that a weak banking system caused by govern-
ment subsidies can destroy an entire economy, the IMF ex-
pressed approval when the Indonesian Bank Restructuring
Agency's ("IBRA") response to the Asian banking crisis result-
ed in a restructuring of their banking structure. 14' No longer
able to walk away, bank owners are being held responsible for
their failures, and are subject to losing not only personal equi-
ty stakes, but the owners also will have to surrender personal
137. Id.
138. Press Release No. 22, 1 (Sept. 28-30, 1999) (on file with IMF), Boards of
Governors - 1999 Annual Meetings, Washington D.C. Statement by the Hon.
Boediono, Alternate Governor of the Bank for Indonesia, International Monetary
Fund [hereinafter BOARDs OF GOVERNORS].
139. Id.
140. Indonesia: Fire-Sale Brigade, THE EcONOMIST, Nov. 14, 1998, at 81 [here-
inafter FIRE SALE].
141. See BOARDS OF GOVERNORS, supra note 138.
142. Id.
143. See FIRE SALE, supra note 140, at 81.
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assets to "plug the holes in their bank."1" Indeed, the IMF
"has come to the conclusion that at the height of a crisis, the
granting of blanket guarantees on deposits and credits can be
a necessary step whose advantages outweigh the disadvan-
tages.""5 Further, the IMF acknowledges that bank restruc-
turing is a complex, costly, and time-consuming process and
that the traditional focus on macroeconomic policies always
may not be sufficient in the face of deep-seated banking prob-
lems.46
By March of 1999, the IMF extended SDR 714 million
(U.S. $1 billion) to Indonesia. 47 As discussed, the IMF was
notably impressed by the advances in bank restructuring; a
foundational mechanism crucial to almost any eventual eco-
nomic recovery. However, the IMF recognized that the political
uncertainty and civil unrest existing in Indonesia had not been
ameliorated yet. Today, the IMF continues to remain opti-
mistic about the macroeconomic gains achieved over the past
year such as lower inflation, falling interest rates, and a rela-
tively stable rupiah, together with the integration of a new
government in Indonesia. 49 While political unrest in Indone-
sia temporarily has halted the IMF mission, IMF officials have
indicated an intention to return when "the right conditions
exist."5 ' With such noble aspirations, it is no surprise that
the IMF will continue to be a vital part of Indonesia's recovery.
144. Id.
145. Stefan Ingves, Lessons of Bank Restructuring from the Asian Crisis, A
Commentary, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/1999/
093099.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999).
146. Id.
147. IMF Completes Review, Augments the Program by US $1 Billion and Ap-
proves US$460 Million Credit Tranche for Indonesia, News Brief No. 99/13, at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1999/NB9913.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999).
148. See BOARDS OF GOVERNORS, supra note 138.
149. William Murray, The Situation in Indonesia and the IMF: A Comment, at
http:J/www.imf.orgexternaYnp/vc1999/091699.htm (last visited Oct. 8,1999).
150. Id. Undoubtedly, the keys "right conditions" require "regaining market
confidence ... to make steady and visible progress in program implementation
and to maintain clarity about the authorities' intentions and commitments. Critical
priorities are the restoration of a sound banking system and resolution of the
overhang of corporate debt, to be achieved amid conditions of improved gover-
nance." IMF Completes First Review of Indonesia Under Its Extended Arrangement,
at http'J/www.imf.org/external/np/secnb/2000/nb0038.htm (last visited July 14,
2000).
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C. Russian Federation
In June of 1992, the Russian Federation became a member
of the IMF. 5' The IMF helped Russia to stabilize and reform
its economy and to obtain sustainable growth in output and
living standards."'52 Albeit not an easy ride, the IMF pro-
gram attempted to reduce inflation by a tight credit policy
designed to stabilize the ruble, reduce the fiscal deficit by re-
quiring large cuts in real expenditure, expand liberalization
and structural reform programs to reduce dispersion of import
duties, and increase privatization. 5' An increase in energy
taxation, coupled with the elimination of most foreign trade
exceptions under a monthly review of the IMF's board, allowed
Russia to become eligible to draw upon the IMF for assis-
tance."M Moreover, the Central Bank of Russia tightened
monetary policy, resulting in declining inflation and an in-
crease in official reserves. 55
In April 1995, the IMF approved a 12 month stand-by
credit of up to SDR 4,313.1 million (approximately U.S. $6,304
million) which was to help stabilize the economy and assist the
151. According to the Treasurer's Department, Accounts and Financial Reports
Division of the IMF, as of November 30, 2000, the Russian Federations General
Resources Account is as follows:
SDR Million % Quota
General Resources Account
Quota 5,945.40 100.00
Fund holdings of currency 14,986.10 252.1
Outstanding Purchases and Loans
Stand-by arrangements 651.14 11.0
Extended arrangements 5,065.76 85.2
Contingency and Compensatory 2,156.55 36.3
Systematic Transformation 1,168.13 19.6
available at http'//www.imf.orglexternal/np/treexfund2.cfn (last visited Dec. 27,
2000).
152. Michel Camdessus, Russia's Transformation Efforts at a Turning Point,
Address (Mar. 29, 1995) at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/mds/1995/
MDS9505.htm [hereinafter RuSSIA'S TRANSFOIMATION].
153. Id. See also Camdessus Says Russia's 1995 Economic Program Will Stabi-
lize Economy and Accelerate Structural Reform, News Brief 95/11, at http'//
www.imf.org.external/np/secnb/1995/NB9511.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 1999). Much
optimism existed for this proposal. Indeed, as Mr. Camdessus stated, "this is a
strong program, which if fully implemented, will achieve macroeconomic stabili-
zation and accelerate structural reform in Russia." Id.
154. Id.
155. IMF Approves Stand-By Credit for Russia, at httpi//www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pr/1995/PR9521.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 1999).
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reform program of the Russian Federation.5 ' The measures
included the introduction of an exchange rate band regime
where the ruble was rated against the U.S. dollar and limited
to a specific range to ensure the "convertibility of the ruble
under the existing liberal foreign exchange system."'57
In March 1996, the. IMF rendered assistance to the Rus-
sian Federation's economic strategy by way of an Extended
Fund Facility (EFF) and provided for SDR 6,901 million (ap-
proximately U.S. $10,087 million) in assistance.' By June,
the Russian Federation accepted the obligations promulgated
under Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement, joining
115 other member countries already subscribed under Article
VIII. 5 ' Article VIII provides that member countries must
"refrain from imposing restrictions on the making of payments
and transfers for current international transactions or from
engaging in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple
currency practices without IMF approval."60
By April of 1997, inflation was down and the exchange
rate had stabilized in the Russian Federation.' At that
time, Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director of the IMF,
elucidated three major problems that needed to be addressed
before the Russian Federation mission could be classified a
success: "growth, the non-payment of taxes and corrup-
tion."62 Nevertheless, by year-end, a minuscule growth in the
economy was apparent and the balance of payments had a
surplus, albeit a major failure of macroeconomic policy was
evident by central government revenue shortfalls." For ex-
156. See id.
157. IMF Management Welcomes Economic Progress Made by Russia; Exchange
Rate Action Designed to Support Program, News Brief No. 95/17, at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1995/NB9517.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999).
158. IMF Approves Three-Year EFF Credit for the Russian Federation, at
http/www.imf.org/external/npsec/pr/1996/pr9613.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2001).
159. Russian Federation Accepts Article VIII Obligations, Press Release No.
96/29, at http/www.imf.orglexternalnp/sec/pr/1996/PR9629.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
1999).
160. Id.
161. Camdessus Praises Russian Stabilization; Outlines Next Steps, News Brief
No. 97/5, at http://www.imf.org/externaYnp/sec/nb/1997/NB9705.HTM [hereinafter
CAMDESSUS] (last visited Sept. 2, 1999).
162. Id.
163. Stanley Fischer, The Russian Economy at the Start of 1998, at
httpJ/www.imf.orglexternal/np/speeches/998/010998.htm [hereinafter FISCHER] (last
visited Nov. 4, 1999).
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ample, in order to enforce tax obligations, Russia established
the Emergency Tax Commission"M because it could not meet
its obligation to pay wages; pensions, or provide basic public
services."' Sadly, (and almost epigrammatical in nature)
Russia's transformation from a communist approach to one
embracing democracy did not achieve the capitalist aims of
democracy.'6
By April of 1998, the Russian economy "passed from the
brink of hyperinflation to single-digit inflation; from substan-
tial isolation to substantial integration in global markets; from
the demise of central planning to the rise of a dynamic private
sector; and from output collapse to a long-awaited renewal of
output growth.""7 By May of 1998, the Russian government
reduced its federal government budget by five percent of
GDP." This action allowed the IMF to consider the seventh
quarterly review under the EEF, which would release a
tranche of U.S. $670 million to the Russian Federation.'69 In
July of 1998, the IMF and the Russian Federation had reached
an agreement whereby a new economic program was proposed,
including structural reforms such as measures designed to
increase the tax system.' Russia acknowledged that it had
to strengthen its policies by "(i) a radical tightening of the
federal budget... (ii) the bolstering of international reserves
of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) through the access to sub-
stantial foreign financing; and (iii) the lengthening of debt
maturity to reduce the vulnerability arising from the short-
term structure of domestic debt."7' Shortly thereafter, the
164. Michel Camdessus, Russia and the IMF: Meeting the Challenges of an
Emerging Market and Transition Economy (Address), at http:J/www.inf.org/external/
np/speeches/1998/040198.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999).
165. Id.
166. See FISCHER, supra note 163.
167. See CAMDESSUS, supra note 161.
168. IMF Welcomes Russian Government's Statement on Fiscal Measures; Man-
agement to Recommend Completion of Review Under Russia's EFF Program, News
Brief No. 98/15, at http:/www.imf.org/externa/np/secdnb/1998/NB9815.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 1999).
169. Id.
170. Russia and the IMF: Meeting the Challenges of an Emerging Market and
Camdessus says IMF Board to Consider Strengthened Program Supported by Sub-
stantial Increase in Financing for Russia, News Brief No. 98/24, at
http://www.inf.org/external/np/sec/1998/NB9824.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999).
171. Memorandum of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Central
Bank of the Russian Federation on Economic and Financial Stabilization Policies,
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IMF approved the Russian Federation's request for financing
and augmented SDR 8.5 billion (approximately U.S. $11.2
billion) in assistance. 7 2 In return, the Russian Federation
agreed to an economic package consisting of reducing the fed-
eral budget deficit by increased tax collection, exchange of
Treasury Bills, and strengthening structural measures."'
The assistance provided by the IMF was intended to serve
as "a solid basis for a fundamental improvement in Russia's
fiscal position and a revitalization of structural reforms."'74
In late July of 1998, however, Russia unexpectedly canceled
three planned debt auctions. 75 Following the discovery that
Russia's central bank's reserves were losing approximately
U.S. $1 billion per week,76 Russia was categorized as a "fi-
nancial outcast."177 Russia appeared to live up to its new-
found reputation as it defaulted on $40 billion of ruble bonds,
together with its apparent inability to repay approximately
$4.8 billion due to the IMF and World Bank.78
In July of 1999, however, the IMF approved a 17-month
Stand-By credit for Russia equivalent to SDR 3.3 billion (ap-
proximately U.S. $4.5 billion) to continue Russia's 1999-2000
economic program.'79 At that time, it was recognized that
Russia's economic program was to focus on fiscal adjustment
and acceleration of structural reforms.' Presently, the fiscal
program targets a primary surplus at the level of the federal
government of two percent of GDP in 1999, with an inflation
rate of 50 percent in 1999 compared to 84.5 percent in 1998,
at httpJ/www.imf.orgexternal/np/loi/071698.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999).
172. IMF Approves Augmentation of Russia Extended Arrangement and Credit
under CCFF; Activates GAB, Press Release No. 98/31, at httpdJ/www.inf.org/ exter-
nal/np/secdpr/1998/PR9831.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999). The financing included a
draw made under the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) to
absolve an export shortfall caused by lower prices of crude oil during 1998.
173. Id.
174. IMF Management Welcomes Executive Board Support for Russia, News
Brief No. 98/26, at http'J/www.imf.org/exteral/np/sec/nb/1998/NB9826.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 1999).
175. The Next Russian Bail Out, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1998, at 60.
176. Id.
177. Russia in Default: Money Can't Buy Me Love, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 6,
1999, at 23.
178. Id.
179. IMF Approves Stand-By Credit for Russia, Press Release No. 99/35, at
http//www.inf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/PR9831.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999).
180. Id.
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net international reserves increasing by U.S. $2.2 billion, and
real GDP declining by two percent in 1999.1 While a money
laundering scheme allegedly siphoned money to the Bank of
New York from the Central Bank of Russia, there is no evi-
dence that any fimds received from the IMF were diverted.'82
Perchance a coincidence, (or perhaps just to be on the safe
side), the July 1999 $4.5 billion relief program to Russia is
held in an account at the IMF and is used only for Russia's
debt service."
It is clear that the current crisis necessitates the IMF's
continued guidance. The IMF will continue to regulate and
review Russia's compliance, with the authority to suspend
payments if commitments made by the Russian Federation are
not fulfilled." Although the Russian Federation economy is
moving slower than anticipated, it is progressing towards an
open, market-oriented system which the IMF can best monitor
under strict conditions. Under the auspices of the IMF, the
risk that investors associate with keeping money in Russia
slowly will dissipate, so that Russia might achieve macroeco-
nomic stability, making it a more favorable climate for foreign
investment."
IV. PROPOSALS
This Note contends that the IMF is a vital organ to lasting
global market expansion. While not a panacea for all of the
problems presently affecting emerging growth countries, the
IMF's presence helps balance social and financial concerns that
result from an integrated world economy. The proposals dis-
cussed below enhance the existing measures implemented by
the IMF and warrant circumspect consideration so that the
IMF may continue to traverse on its present course.
181. Id.
182. Michel Camdessus, A Commentary, Russia: Long Climb Out of a Black
Hole, WASH. POST, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/vd1999/0131399A.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 1999).
183. Facts About IMF Lending to Russia, at http'//www.imf.org/external/np/
vc/1999/091399.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 1999).
184. Id.
185. See supra note 182. See also IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with
the Russian Federation, PIN No. 00/83, Nov. 9, 2000, at http'//www.inf.orgl exter-
nal/np/secpn/2000/pn0083.htm.
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A. Strengthen Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies
The IlMF must strengthen its macroeconomic stabilization
policies. As the world economy becomes more integrated, finan-
cial systems become more global and major countries are af-
fecting each others' economy more so now than at any time in
the past.'86 Further, such economic conditions appear to have
an immediate impact on another country's economy, especially
when an increase of financial market volume and volatility
takes place. Balanced yet flexible international fiscal policies
are necessary and will allow a country to stabilize exchange
rates as it pursues domestic growth and price stability. 87
However, in today's inter-dependent world, it is crucial that no
sharp distinction exists in the intercourse between internation-
al and domestic policies. In so doing, this Note posits that the
established understanding that extant rules governing the
relationships amongst countries to strengthen fiscal and mone-
tary policies must continue in order to achieve greater overall
macroeconomic convergence. For example, major industrial
countries should set in place explicit and firm commitments to
the IMF to focus on international currencies such as the Euro,
the dollar, and the yen to stabilize market expectations. Such
measures will allow countries to stay clear of excessive ex-
change rate misalignments and volatility.88 In addition, defi-
nite rules for exchange rate adjustments must be implemented
to ensure long-term flexibility among currencies. These macro-
economic stabilization reforms will allow the IMF to ameliorate
social concerns such as "rising unemployment, malnutrition
and social marginalization." 9
It is imperative to note that more than just the coordina-
tion of monetary policy and currency intervention among the
major industrial countries is necessary to achieve such goals.
For example, the nub of the problem in the international debt
crisis of 1982 lay with the major industrial countries. 9 In-
186. Indeed, such measures served as the epiphany for the birth of the G-7.
Formed in 1975, the G-7 is a group of seven major industrial countries (hence G-
7) represented by finance ministers who met to discuss joint proposals in an infor-
mal forum. See supra note 13, at A-3.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Social Dimensions of the IMF's Policy Dialogue, at httpJ/vwv.imf.org/
external/np/exr/facts/social.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 1999).
190. Id.
1780 [Vol. XXVI:4
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
deed, as poorer developing countries turned to the IMF for
assistance on an expanded scale, central banks of industrial-
ized countries responded by sharply tightening monetary policy
which simultaneously slowed the growth rate of export mar-
kets for heavily indebted developing countries while raising the
cost of their floating rate debt servicing obligations.' 9' Never-
theless, the IMF's assistance proved invaluable.'92 Focusing
on the problems of the poorest heavily indebted developing
countries in arrears, the IMF recognized that the needed ad-
justments were of a more fundamental kind than it had con-
fronted previously.'93 The IMF revamped its programs and
loosened financing contingencies and banks faced pressure to
ease their rigid terms. For the first time, debt buy-backs in the
secondary market were allowed with refinancing proceeds.194
The IMF's continued flexibility in its dealings will allow devel-
oping countries to influence choices of exchange rate re-
gimes.
95
Commencing in the 1980s, the world's financial system
rapidly evolved due to technological developments in communi-
cations and computers.' 9 As a result, it became apparent
during the 1980s that the United States could no longer con-
tinue to dominate the world economy, and Japan emerged as
-the largest exporter of capital in the world, holding title to the
second largest industrial economy. Concurrently, Asian compe-
tition in Europe accelerated the momentum towards integra-
tion, resulting in a period of prolonged European exchange rate
stability and eventually, with the assistance of policy consulta-
tions in conjunction with the IMF, the implementation of the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union. 97 This example of
IMF macroeconomic policy consultation or "surveillance" serves
as a prototype for the continued success of IMF policy consulta-
tions.
Recently, critics have claimed that IMF bailouts encourage
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See BWC, supra note 13, at A-3.
194. Id.
195. See e.g., Press Conference on Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly
Integrated World Economy, at http:f/www.imf.orglexternal/np/trTROO0414.htm (last
visited July 14, 2000).
196. See THE MAASTRICHT TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION.
197. Id.
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countries to indulge in risky lending practices, and have con-
demned the IMF for not carefully monitoring allocations desig-
nated for specified transactions.19 Most notably, the possible
diversion of approximately $200 million of IMF loans to Rus-
sia, without an extensive audit, was a central focus of criti-
cism.' In reality, however, the IMF has neither the author-
ity to audit such transactions, nor the responsibility to do so.
This Note proposes that the IMF's role be expanded to oversee
such matters in order to avert future allegations of impropri-
eties regarding possible diversion of funds.
B. Expand Structural Adjustment Reforms
The IMF must expand its structural adjustment reforms
and continue to explore new mechanisms to ensure that emerg-
ing growth countries may continue on their path to self-suffi-
ciency. One financial device that may be expanded is the IMF's
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility ("ESAF") which pro-
vides low-interest loans to poor countries."0 However, observ-
ers have criticized ESAF programs for failing to meet objec-
tives of growth, emphasizing short-run stabilization over pover-
ty reduction, failing to ameliorate poverty conditions under
ESAF, as well as causing the reduction in the availability of
social services.2 ' Two extensive reviews commissioned by the
IMF failed to ascertain the veracity of these claims, thus exon-
erating the IMF." 2 This Note contends that such unsubstan-
tiated claims negate the present attempts made by the IMF to
resolve present day issues. Indeed, prior to ESAF implementa-
tion, there was a period of declining per capita income. But
through the mid-1990s, countries benefitting from ESAF have
increased real per capita growth, attributed greatly to
strengthened macroeconomic and structural policies provided
by the IMF."' ESAF's success also can be measured by sever-
al social indicators. To elucidate, infant mortality in emerging
198. Jim Saxton, An Unreformed IMF Doesn't Deserve a Dime, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 22, 1998, at B-4.
199. Bob Davis, IMF Doesn't Watch Fund Disbursement, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24,
1999, at C-1.
200. Id.
201. Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF): Is it Working?, at http:ll
www.imf.orgfexternal/pubs/ft/esaf/exr/index.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 1999).
202. Id.
203. See REsPONsBILITIEs OF THE IMF, supra note 2.
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growth countries has declined by 1.3 percent a year, access to
safe water has increased by 6 percent a year, health care avail-
ability has increased by 11 percent, and primary school enroll-
ment has increased by 1 percent.04 Therefore, it may be ap-
propriate to surmise that IMF policies which encourage stable
and predictable environments through free and open markets
are vital to global financial prosperity and the palliation of
social concerns.
Critics also wrongly condemn the IMF by claiming that
ESAF programs escalate poverty when the available data
points to the contrary.2 5 High inflation, which is tantamount
to a tax on the poor, virtually has been eliminated since ESAF
has been put into practice.0 6 In addition, increased output
growth has caused poverty rates to decline by 20 percent in
countries utilizing ESAF policies. 2" The IMF continues to un-
earth potential problems, adding countermeasures into pro-
grams to protect the poor. Observers also have claimed
that the IMF does not provide an "adequate policy environ-
ment"2 9 for program negotiations. To ensure that ESAF
countries fully are cognizant of the duties that await, the IMF
fostered several initiatives including expansion of program
negotiations to ensure that those charged with implementation
can fulfill their goals.210 In addition, the IMF staff is now in-
volving business and labor groups in program negotiations
with the expectation that political liberalization will continue
to be fostered.21' This Note proposes that such measures, if
continued, will lead to greater government accountability from
countries receiving IMF funding.
204. See supra note 199.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. For example, full implementation of a 12% price increase on petroleum
products was delayed in order to "finalize measures to protect the poor." See, e.g.,
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies: Government of Indonesia and
Bank Indonesia, at httpA/www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2000/idi/02/index.htm. (last
visited July 14, 2000).
209. Id. Adequate policy environment, otherwise known as conditionality, "refers
to conditions of economic policy a lender stipulates as a basis for concluding a
loan arrangement and for allowing subsequent drawings under such an arrange-
ment." See WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 14.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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To the critics' dismay, despite their claims that poverty
reduction is not eradicated by the IMF's emphasis on short-run
stabilization, the evidence points to the contrary. For example,
by reducing large fiscal deficits and inflation, while promoting
sound social spending and public investment programs, several
countries have stabilized their economies and now expect long-
term growth." Observers also claim that ESAF programs
hurt the poor by cutting budget deficits resulting in a decrease
in education and health spending. 1 Nothing could be further
from the truth. In reality, the ESAF programs are not impo-
tent. Rather, the programs target health and education spend-
ing, with an average 4.5 percent yearly increase in real per
capita terms while participating in ESAF sponsored pro-
grams. 4 Moreover, a decrease in infant mortality has been
noted, while school enrollment, literacy, and life expectancy
have been rising."5 Acknowledging the fact that greater in-
roads and faster growth in closing the gap in living standards
in order to alleviate poverty must be implemented, the IMF
has embraced proposals seeking to improve its performance by:
Cutting red tape; tackling corruption; improving the efficiency
of government; increasing social investment (health and educa-
tion), as well as monitoring investment in the infrastruc-
ture.216
Cognizant of the fact that further improvements are neces-
sary to reduce spending in non-productive areas, the IMF, in
collaboration with the World Bank, is working to improve
social programs which will benefit individuals, most notably
the needy, who are affected by adjustment policies.21 In early
1999, the IMF joined with the World Bank to review the Initia-
212. See supra note 201. The IMF supports short run stabilization measures
such as budget cutting and inflation reduction, in conjunction with other objectives
including poverty reduction and social spending in order to promote long-term
growth. Indeed, the IMF contends that the evidence "is now overwhelming that
high inflation and large fiscal deficits are inimical to sustainable growth and pov-
erty reduction." Id. Further in countries with ESAF programs (recent examples
include Uganda, Bolivia, Benin, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Mozambique), the use of
greater aid to promote social spending and public investments have accommodated
stable budget deficits. Id
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
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rive for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) in order to
continue implementing social and economic reforms. 18 The
HIPC Initiative promulgated by the IMF is an important part
of broader efforts to a strategy of poverty reduction.219 A joint
venture, with assistance provided by the IMF and World Bank,
the initiative provides a plan to reduce poverty in emerging
growth countries in the issuance of a Poverty Reduction Strate-
gy Paper (PRSP)Y° This paper proposes that PRSP recom-
mendations will help make poverty reduction a central objec-
tive by its articulation of policies relating to social and anti-
poverty measures.2 ' Further, the IMF recognizes that addi-
tional policies specifically aimed at eradicating poverty must be
implemented.2 In that context, the IMF and the World
Bank recently solicited comments through the IMF Web site,
and conducted worldwide consultative meetings with serious
consideration being devoted to the input received.2"
C. Social Programs
The IMF must continue to explore innovative approaches
to address social concerns if emerging growth countries are to
become and remain self-sufficient. At present, some critics
claim that current IMF practices are merely an exercise in
obsolescence because such practices often deprive emerging
growth countries from becoming self-sufficient.2" However,
the viability of the IMF's continued existence remains at risk
as the dichotomy between those deprecating the IMF vfs-a-vfs
the effects achieved to date continues. Indeed, the IMF's role of
coordinating macroeconomic policies and developing and imple-
menting monetary reforms is an integral part of addressing
social concerns that include the dissipation of social turbu-
218. Proposals to Strengthen the Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Coun-
tries (HIPCs), at http:www.inf.orglexternalnp/hipcdproposal.htm (last visited Oct.
8,1999).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Overview: Transforming the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF) and the Debt Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, at
http:www.imf.org/external/np/esafhipc/1999/ndex/htm (last visited Oct. 8, 1999).
223. Id.
224. See supra note 10.
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lence.' For example, after several decades of outstanding
economic performance, weakness in governance and poor finan-
cial sector supervision in the Asian markets resulted in
borrowings of unhedged, short-term international capital, cul-
minating in the Asian financial crisis in 1997.226 The IMF
launched various economic programs, including, in July 1998,
the infusion of U.S. $1.3 billion of IMF funds to implement
structural reforms in the Asian economy's growth, with an eye
towards reforming existing monopolies and trade barriers. 7
These measures have had a marked effect and have resurrect-
ed the Asian markets.2" While the current political insta-
bility and social disturbances in Indonesia have hindered the
progress made to date, the IMF's role will seek to ensure these
drawbacks are temporary 9
Attacking the IMF's use of its resources in bailouts, includ-
ing tapping into its credit line, critics proffer that countries
will not follow sound financial policies, confident that the IMF
will provide a bailout resulting in the IMF's inability to assist
if another bailout is needed elsewhereY This claim has been
disputed by Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director
of the IMF, who states, "the notion that the availability of IMF
programs encourages reckless behavior by countries is far-
fetched: no country would deliberately court such a crisis even
if it thought international assistance would be forthcoming.
The economic, financial, social and political pain is simply too
great; nor do countries show any great desire to enter IMF
programs unless they absolutely have to.""1
Focusing on macroeconomic stabilization and structural
225. Id.
226. The IMFs Response to the Asian Crisis, at httj/Avww.imf.org/External/np/
exr/facts/asis.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 1999).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Bob Davis, IMF Lacked Cash to Stem Ruble's Latest Plunge, Casting
Doubts on More Bailouts, Agency Tactics, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1998 at C-14.
Critics also charge that the World Bank projects "are being implemented in an
administrative culture which is not just tolerant of collusion and diversion of
funds, but which blatantly expects civil servants to supplement their incomes by
such means." See Glenn R. Simpson, World Bank Memo Depicts Diverted Funds,
Corruption in Jakarta, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1998, at C-16.
231. Stanley Fischer, Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF, available at
http//www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/012298.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 1999).
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adjustment reforms allows the IMF to ameliorate social con-
cerns such as "rising unemployment, malnutrition and social
marginalization." s2 In addition, by its promotion of a stable
system of exchange rates which promote the balanced growth
of international trade, the IMF contributes to sustainable eco-
nomic and human development. To illustrate, since the late
1970s, the IMF has included more open policy making deci-
sions in order to develop a more circumspect relationship with
emerging growth countries.23 Further, IMF measures of cash
compensation (instead of generalized subsidies) and targeted
subsidies protect the poor from rising prices on basic food
items while providing severance pay and retraining for unem-
ployed workers, as well as adoption of permanent social securi-
ty arrangements and improved distribution of medicines and
other essentialsY
To achieve goals of economic stability while promoting self-
determination and self-sufficiency, the IMF proposes a reduc-
tion of nonproductive spending, including military funding in
emerging growth countries. 5 To illustrate, between 1990
and 1996, the IMP's programs allowed social outlays to grow
by 1.2 percent on average while military expenditures were
decreased by an average of 3.1 percent during the same peri-
od. 6 In collaboration with the World Bank, the IMF was
able to increase social programs (including education and
health care) while implementing programs evaluating poverty
and establishing minimum pensions by using funds originally
earmarked for military spending.s 7
V. CONCLUSION
Through policies addressing social concerns, with an inte-
grated world economy and a financial global system, the cen-
tral role of the IMF in coordinating macroeconomic policies and
232. See Policy Dialogue, supra note 57.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. It is interesting to reflect from a psychological standpoint whether a
streamlined military might lead to a reduction in aggression as individuals focus
toward the original target of self. See supra note 14, at 290.
236. Id. As earlier alluded, business is aware of the fact that "war doesn't pay
in this complicated world." See DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA,
ESSAYS ON THE TWENTIETH CENTURY STRUGGLE 50 (1993).
237. See supra note 57.
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in developing and implementing monetary reforms in develop-
ing countries is imperative in light of today's turbulent condi-
tions. Although the world economy is now at a critical junc-
ture, it is important to realize that the IMF is not and cannot
be expected to be a panacea for all of the problems facing
emerging growth countries. However, the IMF should be com-
mended for the measures implemented thus far, including the
innovations designed to reduce poverty. Undoubtedly, the mac-
roeconomic stability achieved will serve both human interest
measures while simultaneously creating a favorable climate for
future foreign investment. Hopefully, the IMF, together with
other world organizations dedicated to the implementation of
social and economic policies, will one day allow Pascal's epi-
gram to conclude that we have finally made "that which is just
strong." 8
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